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ABSTRACT
Behavioral Finance argues that investor behavior influences stock prices, and it 
causes the security price deviate from its fundamental value. These irrational 
investors which influence asset prices by acting according to their feelings are 
called noise traders. Noise trading is about taking a position in a stock with 
false information and keeping that position even though there might some 
information in the markets about the stock which is more important and would 
state otherwise.
Behavioral finance is an argument against the efficient market hypothesis which 
states that the asset prices include all information there is in the markets.
Behavioral finance relaxes the most important assumption of traditional finance 
theory, investor rationality. If psychological concepts such as heuristic 
simplification, mental accounting, reference effects, self-deception and self-
control affect human behavior, should they not also affect investor behavior
and the stock prices?
In this study the overreaction of the stock markets will be followed by forming 
two portfolios: the past losing stocks and the past winning stocks. The 
performance of these portfolios will be followed and analyzed in a four year 
period. It was discovered that the past losing portfolios outperform the winning 
portfolios in a short period of time (3-24 months after). However, 48 months 
after the portfolio formation, the winning portfolios were making far better 
returns.
KEYWORDS: Noise traders, Overreaction, Momentum effect, Heuristic-driven 
bias, Frame dependence, Inefficient markets.
41. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The beginning of behavioral finance
Irrational investors are called noise traders. Noise trading is the opposite of 
information and news in the formulation of trading strategies. Noise makes our 
observations of the real world imperfect. Noise is a diverse array of causal, 
unrelated elements to explain what happens in the real world. Thaler (1994) 
wrote that one way to think about noise is that it is the opposite of news. 
Rational traders make decisions on the basis of news (facts, forecasts, etc.). 
Noise traders make decisions based on anything else. Noise trading provides 
the essential missing ingredient to financial markets. People who trade on noise 
are willing to trade even though from an objective point of view they would be 
better off not trading. Perhaps they think the noise they are trading on is 
information or perhaps they just like to trade. (Black 1986)
Noise trading is a part of behavioral finance. Behavioral finance was first 
established by Kahneman and Tversky in 1974, when they presented the 
principles of representativeness that is judgments based on stereotypes. Before 
their findings, Slovic (1972) had done a study of investor psychology, and it was 
published in The Journal of Finance. In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky 
developed prospect theory, which is a descriptive framework for the way 
people make choices in the face of risk and uncertainty. It provides evidence of 
frame dependence. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) made another study 
where they presented the basics of behavioral finance.  These authors’ works 
play a central role in the field of behavioral finance. (Shefrin 2002: 7, 8)
Behavioral finance has become a major factor in the field of finance. Behavioral 
Finance means that investor behavior influences stock prices, and it causes the 
security price deviate from its fundamental value. The premise of behavioral 
finance is that conventional finance theory ignores how real people make 
decisions and that people make a difference. Behavioral finance is the study of 
how psychology affects financial decision making and financial markets. A 
growing number of economists have come to interpret the anomalies literature 
as consistent with several irrationalities individuals, so called noise traders,
exhibit when making complicated decisions. These irrationalities stem from two 
5main premises: first, that investors do not always process information correctly 
and therefore infer incorrect probability distributions about future rate of 
returns; and second, that even given a probability distribution of returns, 
investors often make inconsistent or systematically suboptimal decisions.
(Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2005: 396)
Behavioral finance is an important and acknowledged part in the major areas of 
finance: portfolio theory, asset pricing, corporate finance, and the pricing of 
options.  Practitioners, such as portfolio managers, financial planners and 
advisers, investors, brokers, strategists, financial analysts, investment bankers, 
traders, and corporate executives, are prone to committing specific errors. 
Behavioral finance can help practitioners recognize their own errors as well as 
the errors of others. Practitioners need to understand that both are important. 
(Shefrin 2002: 4-5.)
The efficient market hypothesis implies that prices usually are right and 
therefore there are no easy profit opportunities. Behaviorists, the supporters of 
behavioral finance, emphasize that two main implications, correct prices and no 
profit opportunities, can be severed: prices can be wrong, but still not give rise 
to easy profit opportunities. Thus, evidence that profit opportunities are scarce 
does not necessarily imply that prices are right. Virtually everyone agrees that if 
prices are right (i.e. price = intrinsic value), then there are no easy profit 
opportunities. Behavioral explanations of efficient market anomalies do not 
give guidance as how to exploit any irrationality. As investors, the question is 
still whether there is money to be made from mispricing, and the behavioral 
literature is largely silent on this point. To discover a model that predicts future 
stock prices and helps to use mispricing to your own advantage is a fascinating 
subject, but also perhaps impossible. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 400)
Some researchers believe that the efficient-market hypothesis ignores important 
aspects of human behavior. For example, psychologists find that people tend to 
place too much emphasis on recent events when they are predicting the future. 
If so, we may find that investors are liable to overreact to new information. It 
will be interesting to see how far such behavioral observations can help us to 
understand apparent anomalies. (Brealey et. al. 2003: 1000.) This is the reason 
why behavioral finance is really important nowadays. We need to understand 
the effects that human behavior has to volatility in stock prices. There is too 
6much volatility in the markets, and it can not be solely explained by the amount 
of trading.
Most investors make their investment decisions based on their feelings. 
Employers often buy securities from their own firms; analysts tend to predict 
the future from the past; investors buy winners rather than losers; investors 
trade too much; to non-information there should be no movement in the price 
of a security; the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) and so on. These 
are all due to psychological phenomena, and it is necessary to further 
investigate the psychological nature of finance.
This study assumes that the anomalies, which irrational investors spread, have 
a significant affect to stock prices. Psychology will form a big part of this study.
Shefrin (2002: 12) writes that the main themes of behavioral finance are 
heuristic-driven bias, frame dependence and inefficient markets. For example
representativeness, overconfidence, anchoring and adjustment, aversion to 
ambiguity, cognitive limitations, hedonic editing, loss aversion, regret, mental 
accounting, and money illusion are the psychological areas of behavioral 
finance. These topics as well as stock valuation will form most of the theoretical 
part of this study.
After the introduction this study is divided into theoretical part and the 
empirical part. The second chapter is about the efficient market theory, and it 
will take a closer look at how stock prices can be calculated according to 
efficient market theory. The third section will describe what kind of investors 
there are in the financial markets. The fourth part is headlined as behavioral 
finance and it is the most important theoretical part. It tells about all the 
anomalies that noise traders spread. The fifth part is the empirical part in which 
this study will show the connection between investor behavior and stock prices. 
Finally the sixth part is the conclusion of all information collected. The last part 
is references and appendix.
71.2. Research problem and hypothesis
This study investigates the performance of winning and losing stocks in the 
Helsinki stock exchange in the years 2001-2006. There have been many 
revealing studies that past losers seem to outperform the past winning stocks. It 
is really interesting to see how the Helsinki stock exchange behaves in the 21st
century.
De Bondt & Thaler (1985, 1987) found evidence of overreaction in the stock 
markets. They concluded that investors become overly pessimistic about past 
losers and overly optimistic about past winners. Thus this instance of heuristic-
driven errors causes prices to deviate from fundamental values. Losers are 
undervalued and winners are overvalued for a while, but over time mispricing 
will correct itself. Hence losers will outperform the general market and winners 
will underperform. This finding is an explicit evidence for anomalies and noise 
trading in the stock markets. Their results also shed new light on the January 
returns earned by prior winners and losers. Portfolios of losers experience 
exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio 
formation. This study will take a closer look at this fact and the January effect 
on stock prices will be followed carefully, as well.
Unlike De Bondt et. al. (1985, 1987), Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) wrote that 
strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks 
that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns 
over 3- to 12-month holding periods. They argued that the results of De Bondt 
and Thaler can be explained by the systematic risk of their contrarian portfolios 
and the size effect. They added that in addition, since the long-term losers 
outperform the long-term winners only in Januaries, it is unclear whether their 
results can be attributed to overreaction. This overreaction can also be called 
momentum effect when investors are acting accordingly what the markets 
present at one point. Many people forget that the whole picture is a lot larger 
than just one day and single information.
It is hypothesized that past performance of stocks has a big influence to the 
future behavior of stock prices. This is because of investor overreaction. The 
opposite hypothesis is that it does not have any influence to stock prices and the 
8winning stocks will still do better than the losing stocks. The interesting results 
will be shown in the research part.
1.3. Findings of empirical study
There have been many interesting studies about how noise traders affect to 
stock prices. Campbell and Kyle (1991) investigated the smart money and noise 
trader influence to stock prices. They found that the type of noise that appears 
to be empirically important is highly correlated with fundamental value. It is
called overreaction, since it makes the stock price respond more to news about 
fundamentals than it otherwise would do. In their model where absolute risk is 
constant, a rise in the stock market which increases investor wealth will 
stimulate the demand for stocks by investors with declining absolute risk 
aversion. These investors follow “portfolio insurance” strategies, increasing 
their demand for risky assets with the price of risky assets. They pointed out 
that investment strategies of this sort increase stock market volatility, 
particularly in episodes such as the October 1987 stock market crash.
Kelly (1997) assumed that an individual’s probability of being a noise trader 
was diminishing in income, and conversely for the probability of being smart 
money. He found evidence that a strong participation level of the general 
population was negatively correlated with returns. Participation of very high-
income households was strongly positively correlated with returns, and it 
changed in direct response to noise trader participation. His study showed 
quite clearly that high-income households are the one who make rational 
investment decisions.
De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990) presented a simple 
overlapping model of an asset market in which irrational traders with 
erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected return. 
They wrote that the unpredictability of noise trader’s beliefs creates a risk in the 
price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting 
against them. As a result prices can diverge significantly from fundamental 
values even in the absence of fundamental risk. In the empirical part of the 
study, they found that the risk created by the unpredictability of 
unsophisticated investors reduces the attractiveness of arbitrage. Another 
9interesting thing is that noise traders can earn higher expected returns even 
when they buy high and sell low. De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann
(1991) made another study where they investigated the survival of noise traders 
in the financial markets. They presented a model of portfolio allocation by noise 
traders who form incorrect expectations chiefly about the variance of the return 
distribution of a particular asset. They showed that noise traders not only can 
earn higher returns than rational arbitrageurs but also can dominate the market 
in terms of wealth in the long run.
Trueman (1988) investigated the theory of noise trading in security markets. He 
found that noise trading should be more commonly observed in riskier assets, 
and as a result of this, the positive relation between fund turnover and 
performance should be weaker for those funds that specialize in riskier assets.
Trueman claimed that this result may be useful for more detailed empirical 
work measuring the association between turnover and performance.
Palomino (1996) made a research in small markets. He found that in an 
imperfectly competitive market where investors are risk-averse, if the opinion 
of amateurs is unpredictable, amateurs may, on average, obtain higher utility 
relative to professional investors. Palomino stated, that this means that noise 
traders earn higher profits and this can not be attributed to pure luck.
Nevertheless, the researcher admitted that noise traders may explain some 
anomalies in the markets. He also thought that noise traders bring an additional 
risk to the small markets, thus rational arbitrageurs rather trade on high 
liquidity markets.
Kahneman et. al. (1974, 1979) have shown empirically that people are irrational 
in a consistent and correlated manner. However, the case for the efficient 
market theory can be made even in situations where the trading strategies of 
investors are correlated. As long as there are some smart investors and arbitrage 
opportunities, they will exploit any mispricing and the irrational investors will 
lose money and eventually disappear from the market.
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2. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
2.1. Efficient markets
The basic theoretical case for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) rests on 
three arguments which rely on progressively weaker assumptions. First,
investors are assumed to be rational and hence to value securities rationally. 
Second, to the extent that some investors are not rational, their trades are 
random and therefore cancel each other out without affecting prices. Third, to 
the extent that investors are irrational in similar ways, they are met in the 
market by rational arbitrageurs who eliminate their influence on prices. 
(Shleifer 2000: 2)
The purpose of capital markets is to transfer funds between lenders and 
borrowers efficiently. Individuals or firms may have access to productive 
investment opportunities with anticipated rate of return that exceed the market-
determined borrowing rate but not enough funds to take advantage of all these 
opportunities. However, if capital markets exist, they can borrow the needed 
funds. Lenders, who have excess funds after exhausting all their productive 
opportunities with expected returns greater than the borrowing rate, will be 
willing to lend their excess funds because the borrowing/lending rate is higher 
than what they might otherwise earn. Therefore both borrowers and lenders are 
better off if efficient capital markets are used to facilitate fund transfers. The 
stock markets work much with the same principal: investors buy the stocks of a 
company and they both benefit of this deal. Although the risk in the stock 
market is much higher than in the capital markets, but so are the possible 
earnings. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri 2005: 353).
When economists speak of capital markets as being efficient they usually mean 
that they view asset prices and returns as being determined as the outcome of 
supply and demand in a competitive market, peopled by rational traders. These 
rational traders rapidly assimilate any information that is relevant to the 
determination of asset prices and returns (e.g. future dividend prices) and 
adjust prices accordingly. Hence, individuals do not have different comparative 
advantages in the acquisition of information. This means that abnormal returns 
from trading should be zero. Thus, agents process information efficiently and 
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immediately incorporate this information into stock prices. If current and past 
information is immediately incorporated into current prices then only new 
information or news should cause changes in prices. (Cuthbertson 2002: 93.)
Statistical research has shown that to a close approximation stock prices seem to 
follow a random walk with no discernible predictable patterns that investors 
can exploit. Such findings are now taken to be evidence of market efficiency, 
that is, evidence that market prices reflect all currently available information. 
Only new information will move stock prices, and this information is equally 
likely to be good or bad news. If you are not sure what is meant by “random 
walk”, you might like to think of the following example: You are given $100 to 
play a game. At the end of each week a coin is tossed. If it becomes heads, you 
win 3 percent of your investment; if it becomes tails you lose 2.5 percent. 
Therefore, your capital at the end of the first week is either $103,00 or $97,50. At 
the end of the second week the coin is tossed again. Now the possible outcomes 
are: (Brealey et. al. 2005: 405. Bodie et. al 2003: 348)
Figure 1. Coin tossing game is describing the random walk (Brealey et. al. 2003: 
348)
The drift is equal to the expected outcome: (1/2) * 3 + (1/2) * (-2.5) = 0.25%
This process is a random walk with a positive drift of 0.25 percent per week. It 









the odds each week are the same, regardless of the value at the start of the week 
or of the same pattern of heads and tails in the previous week. (Brealey et. al. 
2003: 348)
Perfect capital markets:
o Every market participant thinks and acts rationally
o Every market participant can lend and borrow with same conditions 
and same market rate; there does not exist any discrimination and the 
markets are open for everybody
o Every market participant can get the necessary information freely and 
with no costs
o None of the market participants can not affect the price of a security, 
because the amount of market participants is so huge
o The market securities are totally real and liquid and they can be sold 
for the market price what ever the trance is
o There are not any bankruptcy costs in the market
o There are not any taxes in the market
o There are not any transaction costs in the market. (Leppiniemi 2000: 
99-100)
2.2. Forms of efficiency
Eugene Fama has done many studies concerning market efficiency. Fama’s 
works are the groundwork of efficient market hypothesis (EMH). As already 
stated, EMH implies that security prices accurately reflect all available 
information and respond rapidly to new information as soon as it becomes 
available. According to Fama EMH comes in three flavors, corresponding to 
different definitions of available information. The weak form, i.e. the random 
walk theory, says that prices reflect all information in past prices. The 
semistrong form says that prices reflect all publicly available information, and 
the strong form holds that prices reflect all acquirable information. (Brealey, 
Myers 2003: 996).
The weak-form hypothesis asserts that stock prices already reflect all 
information that can be derived by examining market trading data such as the 
history of past prices, trading volume, or short interest. This version of the 
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hypothesis implies that trend analysis is fruitless. Past stock price data are 
publicly available and virtually costless to obtain. In other words this might 
imply that technical analysis is of no use. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 373).
The semi-strong form hypothesis states that the stock prices include all public 
information. This kind of information is for example financial statements, 
dividends, new products, prowess of the management, earnings predictions etc.
The semistrong-form also embodies the weak form because the timelines of 
prices are public information. If the markets do not perform the semistrong-
form conditions, an investor could act after the information has been 
announced and this way earn some abnormal return. In other words, neither 
fundamental analysis nor technical analysis can be used to achieve superior 
gains. (Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström, 2002: 83).
The strong form of efficiency states that prices reflect not just public 
information but all the information that can be acquired by painstaking analysis 
of the company and the economy. In such a market we would see lucky and 
unlucky investors, but we would not find any superior investment managers 
who can consistently beat the market. In other words, even insider information 
is off no use. (Brealey et. al. 2003: 351).
2.3. Stock valuation models
The valuation of stocks is a difficult task. Many researchers have developed 
models that follow the market value of a stock quite closely, but since the 
beginning of capital markets, nobody has made-up a perfect model, which 
predicts the security prices precisely as they are in the market. The simplest 
model of stock market movements, which was generally accepted at least as an 
approximation until the early 1990’s, is that the stock price equals the present 
value of expected future dividends, discounted at a constant rate. This model 
has been proved quite accurate even though it ignores all the basic foundations 
of finance. (Brealey et. al. 2003)
The valuation models are based on the calculation of discounted cash flows 
which the stockholders receive. The main point about these models is that they 
take into account the time value of money. The biggest problem and the factor 
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that causes insecurity in defining a company’s equity capital is that the 
shareholder’s earnings depend on the future cash flows of the company. 
Because of this, when a stockholder is doing his investment decisions, it is 
uncertain how big cash flows does his investment involve, whereas there exists 
a big uncertainty compared to cash flows of bonds. (Nikkinen et. al. 2002: 148)
As already stated the dividend discount model is the simplest way to analyze 
stock prices. Free cash flow based method (FCF) and the economic value added 
(EVA) are also widely used methods to approximate the stock prices. Besides 
these, there are few techniques that are used. For example many investors look 
for peaks and bottoms of market indexes and stocks i.e. they use technical 
analysis to evaluate security prices. Fundamental analysis is also commonly 
used technique, because it uses financial statement data for analysis. This study 
will tell more about those methods in the next chapter.
2.3.1. Dividend discount model
The most common way to analyze stock prices is the dividend discount model. 
The method calculates the current price of a stock by discounting all the future 
dividend cash flows. Many researcher have found it to be the most efficient and 
accurate method to calculate the stock price. The Dividend Discount Model is 
also known as the "Gordon model" named after Professor Gordon who 
popularized the model in 1962. The dividend discount model is a broadly
accepted stock valuation instrument found in most introductory finance and 
investment textbooks. The model calculates the present value of the future 
dividends that a company is expected to pay to its shareholders. It is 
particularly useful because it allows investors to determine an absolute or 
intrinsic value of a particular company that is not influenced by current stock 
market conditions. (Bodie et. al. 2005)




















S0 = Stock price
Div = Dividend price at time t
r = is the risk free interest rate
The equation above assumes that investors hold the stock for the life of the firm. 
However, Bodie et. al. (2005: 611) say that this equation is not very useful in 
valuing stocks because it requires dividend forecasts for every year into the 
indefinite future.
2.3.2. Free cash flow valuation
The free cash flow based model (FCF) means that instead of dividends you 
discount all future cash flows, which basically would be divided for 
shareholders, to present value. The advantage of FCF is that the company’s 
dividend policy can not influence the model and the results as Modigliani & 
Miller (MM) concluded. Another benefit of using FCF, compared to methods 
which use earnings as a discount variable, is the fact that different kind of 
accounting figures are not able to manipulate the amount of cash flow. This 
way, for example accounting, practices or the changes which happen in these 




P0 = Price of the stock
FCFt = Free cash flow of the company during time t
r = Risk free interest rate
The free cash flow valuation based method was first presented by MM. They
claim that if we take as given a firm’s future investments, then the value of its 


















Therefore, neither the firm’s dividend policy nor its capital structure should 
affect the value of a share of its equity. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 634)
2.3.3. Economic value added (EVA)
Among the management tools EVA, in particular, emphasizes the interests of 
the owners. In other words, the owner’s expect a maximum compensation over 
the cost of the capital invested in the firm. In line with the theory of finance the 
RI derivative EVA is commonly advocated as a management tool because the 
goal of the firm is to add to the value of the owners' wealth. In other words, the 
owners expect a maximum compensation over the cost of the capital invested in 
the firm. A central question concerning EVA is how sensitive this management 
tool is to the changes in its various components, management policies and 
external economic factors. (Salmi & Virtanen 2001)
EVA can be calculated as:
EVA = NOPAT - WACC * Capital
Where,
NOPAT = Net operating profit after taxes and
WACC = is the weighted average cost of capital.
Despite the unambiguous theoretical definition, applying EVA even in its pure, 
theoretical format is not straight-forward. EVA is defined as the difference 
between the firm's profit and cost of all capital employed, i.e. the weighted 
average cost of debt and equity. Measuring the profit of the firm and measuring 
the components of the cost of capital is problematic both in theory and in 
practice. In particular, measuring the cost of equity is a highly involved issue. 




Much of the real-world discussion of stock market valuation concentrates on 
the firm’s price-earnings multiple, the ratio of price per share to earnings per 
share, commonly called the P/E ratio. P/E ratio is widely used in the valuation 
of stocks. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 622.) Fuller et. al. (1987: 274) conclude that 
estimating an appropriate P/E ratio has long been a favorite approach among 
security analysts for deciding whether stocks are under- or overpriced.
Price-to-Book Ratio
This is the ratio of price per share divided by book value per share. Some 
analysts view book value as a useful measure of value and therefore treat the 
ratio of price to book value as an indicator of how aggressively the market 
values the firm. (Bodie et. al. 2005:632)
Price-to-Sales Ratio
Many start-up firms have no earnings. As a result, the price-earnings ratio for 
these firms is meaningless. The price-to-sales ratio (the ratio of stock price to the 
annual sales per share) has recently become a popular valuation benchmark for 
these firms. Of course, price-to-sales ratios can vary markedly across industries, 
since profit margins vary widely. (Bodie et. al. 2005:633)
2.4. Arbitrage
A textbook definition (Sharpe and Alexander 1990) defines arbitrage as the 
‘simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in 
two different markets at advantageously different prices.’ Scholes (1972) 
reasons that when arbitrage is needed to make markets efficient, individual 
stocks must have close substitutes for such arbitrage to work well. When close 
substitutes are available, arbitrageurs can sell expensive securities and buy 
cheap close substitutes, thereby equalizing their relative prices and bringing 
markets to efficiency. (Shleifer 2000: 4, 9.)
The central argument of behavioral finance states that, in contrast to the 
efficient markets theory, real-world arbitrage is risky and therefore limited. The 
effectiveness of arbitrage relies crucially on the availability of close substitutes 
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for securities whose price is potentially affected by noise trading. For some so 
called derivative securities close substitutes are usually available, although 
arbitrage may still require considerable trading. Stocks do not have close 
substitutes, thus arbitrage does not help to pin down price levels. An 
arbitrageur who thinks that stocks as a whole are overpriced cannot sell short 
stocks and buy a substitute portfolio, since such a portfolio does not exist. The 
arbitrageur can instead simply sell or reduce exposure to stocks in the hope of 
an above-market return, but this arbitrage is not even close to riskless, 
especially since the average expected return on stocks is high and positive.
(Shleifer 2000: 13, 14)
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3. DIFFERENT TYPES OF INVESTORS
Investors can be divided into three groups: active investors, passive investors 
and noise traders. All these investors use different investment approaches to 
make profits. Active investors try to earn money with day trading and 
following the markets very closely. The most ordinary group of active investors 
is practitioners. Passive investors invest their capital into stocks and bonds, and 
they keep their positions for a long time. Passive portfolio management is
especially common for example in retirement savings, when individuals try to 
earn profit with low risk. Noise trading, for one, is very universal phenomena 
and it happens in active investing as in passive investing. The most important 
part about noise is that you can find it everywhere. The deciding factor is that 
investors have to decide whether the information they have is significant or is it 
just a noise, which has nothing to do with the fundamentals. These phenomena 
confuse the capital markets all the time. (Grinold & Kahn 1995)
There are different methods to evaluate the future movements of stock prices. 
Main approaches are technical analysis and fundamental analysis. These two 
methods differ a lot from each other. Usually practitioners, such as analysts, use 
technical analysis to valuation. They are looking for peaks and bottoms and try 
to invest assets by following the market trend. Fundamental analysis, for one, is 
used when practitioners explore the financial statements of companies and try 
to predict the future movements of stock price by different figures.
3.1. Technical Analysis
Mostly professional investors use the technical approach to valuing stocks. 
Those who use technical analysis look for peaks, bottoms, trends, patterns and 
other factors affecting a stock's price movement and then make buy or sell 
decisions based on those factors. It is a technique many people attempt, but few 
are truly successful at it. Many people have claimed that they have done a lot of 
profit by buying stocks, which they have selected through technical analysis. In 
many cases these winners can be seen as pure luck and there is hardly anything 
to do with fundamentals. (Bodie et. al. 2005)
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Trend types can be divided into three groups:
1. The primary trend is the long-term movement of prices, lasting from 
several months to several years.
2. Secondary or intermediate trends are caused by short-term deviations of 
prices from the underlying trend line. These deviations are eliminated 
via corrections, when prices revert back to trend values.
3. Tertiary or minor trends are daily fluctuations of little importance. 
(Bodie et. al. 2005: 374)
Technical analysts usually evaluate securities by taking into account past prices, 
market activity and volume. Technical analysts do not try to measure the 
intrinsic value of a stock; instead they look for stock charts for trends and cycles 
that will determine a stock’s future performance. However many past studies 
have shown that it is almost impossible to predict the future performance of a 
stock from the past. Competition in technical research will tend to ensure that 
current prices reflect all information in the past sequence of prices and that 
future price changes cannot be predicted from past prices. (Brealey et. al. 2003)
3.2. Fundamental analysis
Financial statement analysis is the biggest part of fundamental analysis which is 
also known as quantitative analysis. Fundamental analysis uses earnings and 
dividend prospects of the firm, expectations of future interest rates and risk 
evaluation of the firm to determine proper stock prices. Ultimately, it represents 
an attempt to determine the present discounted value of all the payments a 
stockholder will receive from each share of stock. If that value exceeds the stock 
price, the fundamental analyst would recommend purchasing the stock.
Fundamental analysis is much more difficult than merely identifying well-run 
firms with good prospects. Discovery of good firms does an investor no good in 
and of itself if the rest of the market also knows those firms are good. If the 
knowledge is already public, the investor will be forced to pay a high price for 
those firms and will not realize a superior rate of return. The trick is not to 
identify firms that are good, but to find firms that are better than everyone 
else’s estimate. Similarly poorly run firms can be great bargains if they are not 
quite as bad as their stock prices suggest. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 377)
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3.3. Active investors
Investors who believe in active portfolio management do not follow the 
efficient market hypothesis. They believe it is possible to profit from the stock 
market through any number of strategies to identify mispriced securities. 
Active management is the opposite of passive management, to which this study 
will come up in the next section. The first necessary ingredient for success in 
active management is recognition of the challenge. Financial economists and 
quantitative researchers fall in three categories: those who think successful 
active management is impossible, those who think it is easy and those who 
think it is difficult. Despite the efficient market hypothesis, it is clear that 
markets cannot be perfectly efficient; hence there are reasons to believe that 
active management can have effective results. (Grinold et. al. 1995)
Individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay a tremendous 
performance penalty for active trading. Of 66 465 households with accounts at a 
large discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn an annual 
return of 11,4 percent, while the market returns 17,9 percent. The average 
household earns an annual return of 16,4 percent, tilts its common stock 
investment toward high-beta, small, value stocks and turns over 75 percent of 
its portfolio annually. This high level of trading can be at least partly explained 
by a simple behavioral bias: People are overconfident and overconfidence leads 
to too much trading. These figures quite clearly indicate that if an investor is 
practicing active management, he has to know all the facts. The knowledge of 
traditional finance theory is not enough; the behavioral finance is as important 
part of investing as the traditional side. Central message in this evidence is that 
trading is hazardous to your wealth. (Barber & Odean 2000)
3.4. Passive investors
From the perspective of the financial economist, active portfolio management 
appears an ordinary consideration, if not an entirely dubious proposition. 
Modern financial economics, with its theories of market efficiency, inspired the
move over the past decade away from active management – trying to beat the 
market – to passive management – trying to match the market. Passive 
22
investment strategy is usually characterized by a buy-and-hold strategy. (Bodie 
et. al. 2005)
Passive portfolio management usually involves buying assets and keeping them 
for a long time. Several financial studies have shown that in the long run 
keeping your investments in the same securities proves to be more profitable 
than trading frequently. Overconfidence usually encourages people to trade
and they might even think that they have superior information over some 
security. To address the puzzle of why so much trading occurs, it would be 
useful to understand what motivates trades and whether such motivations are 
rooted in behavioral hypotheses, such as an aversion to realizing losses, a 
misguided belief in contrarianism or momentum that might be evidence of 
overconfidence  or a love of gambling. (Keloharju and Grinblatt 2001; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998)
3.5. Noise traders
Noise traders are those who falsely believe that they have special information 
about the future price of risky assets. A consequence of noise trading is that, if 
investors have short horizons and noise traders’ misperceptions cannot be 
forecasted by arbitrageurs, then the fundamental risk is not the only source of 
risk in the market. In Black’s basic model of financial markets, noise is 
contrasted with information. People sometimes trade on information in the 
usual way. They are correct in expecting to make profits from these trades. On 
the other hand, people sometimes trade on noise as if it were information. If 
they expect to make profits from noise trading, they are incorrect. However,
Black stated, that noise trading is essential to the existence of liquid markets.
(Black 1986; Palomino 1996)
Few will disagree with Black’s assessment that real financial markets differ 
from their textbook counterparts in comprising noise traders as well as 
completely informed, Bayesian, expected utility maximizers. Although the idea 
that a subset of agents trade on the basis of extraneous information with no 
bearing on fundamentals have been formalized in a variety of intuitively 
reasonable models, most of the empirical evidence offered in support of these 
models is indirect. (Black 1986; Kelly 1997)
23
The effects of noise in the real world and our views of the world are profound. 
Noise in the sense of a large number of small events is often a causal factor 
much more powerful than a small number of large events can be. Noise makes
trading in financial markets possible, and thus allows us to observe prices for 
financial assets. Noise causes markets to be somewhat inefficient, but often 
prevents us from taking advantage of inefficiencies. Noise in the form of 
uncertainty about future tastes and technology by sector causes business cycles, 
and makes them highly resistant to improvement through government 
intervention. Noise in the form of expectations that need not follow rational 
rules causes inflation to be what it is, at least in the absence of a gold standard 
or fixed exchange rates. Noise in the form of uncertainty about what relative 
prices would be with other exchange rates makes us think incorrectly that 
changes in exchange rates or inflation rates cause changes in trade or 
investment flows or economic activity. Most generally, noise makes it very 
difficult to test either practical or academic theories about the way that financial 
or economic markets work. We are forced to act largely in the dark. (Black 1986)
One of the fundamental concepts in finance is arbitrage, defined the 
simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in 
two different markets for advantageously different prices. An important reason 
why arbitrage is limited is that movements in investor sentiment are in part 
unpredictable and therefore arbitrageurs betting against mispricing run the 
risk, at least in the short run, that investor sentiment becomes more extreme 
and prices move even further from fundamental value. As a consequence of 
such noise trader risk, arbitrage positions can lose money in the short run.
(Shleifer 2000: 28; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998)
Arbitrage in a nutshell goes like this. If noise traders hold stocks when the price 
is above the fundamental value, then the smart money should sell these assets 
to the noise traders thus pushing down the price. As the price falls towards its 
fundamental value the noise traders lose money and tend towards bankruptcy 
while the smart money can if they wish buy back the stocks at the lower price. 
On the other hand, if the noise traders hold assets whose price is below the 
fundamental value, then the smart money should purchase such assets from the 
noise traders and they will then make a profit as the price rises towards the 
fundamental value. Hence the net effect is that the noise traders lose money and 
therefore should disappear from the market leaving only the smart money. 
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When this happens the prices should then reflect fundamentals. On the other 
hand, it is possible that noise traders can push the price of an asset even further 
from fundamentals and this way the smart money will lose money. 
(Cuthbertson 2002: 177)
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4. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING
As already stated, behavioral Finance is the study of how psychology affects 
finance and security prices. Psychology is the basis for human desires, goals 
and motivations, and it is also the basis for a wide variety of human errors that 
stem from perceptual illusions, overconfidence, over-reliance on rules-of-thumb 
and emotions. Errors and bias cut across the entire financial landscape, affecting 
individual investors, institutional investors, analysts, strategists, brokers, 
portfolio managers, option traders, currency traders, futures traders, plan 
sponsors, financial executives and financial commentators in the media.
(Shefrin 2002: IX)
Behavioral finance relaxes the most important assumption of traditional finance 
theory, investor rationality. If psychological concepts such as heuristic 
simplification, mental accounting, reference effects, self-deception, self-control, 
dislike of ambiguity and social interactions affect (or plague) human behavior, 
should they not also affect investor behavior? This question should give a 
reasonable doubt to an investor whether or not he is rational in investment 
decision making. In an efficient markets all ‘players’ have access to the same 
information, they process the information in the same ‘rational way’ and all 
have equal opportunities for borrowing and lending. In the real world these 
conditions are unlikely to be met. For example, different investors may form 
different probability assessments about future outcomes or use different 
economic models in determining expected returns. (Cuthbertson 2002: 169)
Behavioral finance focuses on systematic irrationalities that characterize 
investor decision making. These “behavioral shortcomings” may be consistent 
with some of the efficient market anomalies uncovered by several researchers. 
By and large, the performance record of professionally managed funds lends 
little credence to claims that most professionals can consistently beat the 
market. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 406)
The next chapter will take a look at the main points in psychology of investing 
and the cognitive limitations that the practitioners spread. Behavioral finance is 
the application of psychology to financial behavior – the behavior of 
practitioners. Three main themes in behavioral finance are called heuristic-
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driven bias, frame dependence and inefficient markets (Shefrin 2002: 3-5.
Linnainmaa 2003: 9)
This chapter concludes all the behavioral biases that subsist. These topics
should all be thought of a same theme that live and survive separately and on 
the other hand coexist and interact with different ways in the formulation of 
behavioral errors and financial decision making. Financial decision making is 
not only about the numbers and financial statements. Sentiment is a big part of 
selection in everything.
4.1. Heuristic-Driven Bias
The dictionary definition for the word heuristic refers to the process by which 
people find things out for themselves, usually by trial and error. Trial and error 
often leads people to develop rules of thumb, but this process often leads to 
other errors. One of the great advances of behavioral psychology is the 
identification of the principles underlying these rules of thumb and the 
systematic errors associated with them. In turn, these rules of thumb have 
themselves come to be called heuristics. (Shefrin 2002: 13)
Investors’ typical errors i.e. heuristic-driven bias:
 People develop general principles as they find things out for themselves
 They rely on heuristics, rules of thumb, to draw inferences from the 
information at their proposal
 People are susceptible to particular errors because the heuristics they use 
are imperfect
 People actually commit errors in particular situations. (Shefrin 2002: 14)
Availability bias is a good example of errors that investors exhibit. Availability 
refers to information which is in the open markets and it affects investors’
decision making. Irrational investors analyze information in different ways and 
they appreciate information by their own non-logical methods. They usually 
ignore the information that contradicts their own prior beliefs and overweight 
the information they already have. (Shefrin 2002: 14)
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4.1.1. Representativeness
One of the most important things that affect financial decision making is 
representativeness which states that decision making is based on stereotypes. 
The advantage of heuristics is that they reduce the time and effort required to 
make reasonably good judgments and decisions. Representativeness leads to 
very predictable biases in certain situations. The reason for focusing on biases 
rather than successes is that biases usually reveal more of the underlying 
processes than do successes. Virtually all current theories of decision making 
are based on the results of research concerning biases in judgment. (Plous 1993: 
109)
For example, people often predict future uncertain events by taking a short 
history of data and asking what broader picture this history is representative of. 
In focusing on such representativeness, they often do not pay enough attention 
to the possibility that the recent history is generated by chance rather than by 
the model they are constructing. Investors may extrapolate short past histories 
of rapid earnings growth of some companies too far into the future and 
therefore overprice these companies. Representativeness leads to overreaction 
and overreaction to non-information might lead to price bubbles. (Shleifer 2000: 
11)
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) acknowledged that people seem to make 
predictions according to a simple matching rule: the predicted value is selected 
so that the standing of the case in the distribution of outcomes matches its 
standing in the distribution of impressions.  This rule-of-thumb, an instance of 
what Kahneman and Tversky call the representativeness heuristic, violates the 
basic statistical principal that the extremeness of predictions must be moderated 
by considerations of predictability. De Bondt (1985) found that there is also 
considerable evidence that the actual expectations of professional security 
analysts and economic forecasters display the overreaction bias.
A financial example illustrating representativeness is the winner-loser effect 
documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). They found that stocks that 
have been extreme past losers in the previous three years do much better than 
extreme past winners over the following three years. De Bondt (1992) explained
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that the long-term earnings forecasts made by security analysts tend to be 
biased in the direction of recent success. (Shefrin 2002: 16).
4.1.2. Overconfidence leads to overreaction
No problem in judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more 
potentially catastrophic than overconfidence. Due to their overconfidence, 
investors will trade too much. You can see overconfidence everywhere when 
people make decisions. They tend to be overconfident about their abilities and 
usually underweight the new significant information if it conflicts their own 
prior information. Shefrin et. al. (1994) and Odean (1999) concluded that noise 
traders do not understand that they are at an informational disadvantage, and 
thus make bad bets in the stock markets. The second reason is that investors 
trade too much, which is a clear evidence of overconfidence.  Excessive trading 
leads to higher trading volume. 
The overreaction hypothesis is an interesting part of behavioral finance. The 
obvious question is to ask: How does the anomaly survive the process of 
arbitrage? There has been considerable evidence that the existence of some 
rational agents is not sufficient to guarantee rational expectations equilibrium in 
an economy with some of what they call quasi-rational agents. Consistent with 
the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis, portfolios of prior losers are 
found to be to outperform prior winners. Thirty-six months after portfolio 
formation the losing stocks have earned about 25 % more than the winners, 
even though the latter are significantly more risky. The overreaction and 
momentum effect will be tested in the empirical part. (De Bondt et. al. 1985)
Gambler’s fallacy is described that investors are like gamblers and they have 
this erroneous belief about future stock price movements and they act 
according to their cognitive limitations. For example, if five tosses of a fair coin 
all turn out to be heads, what is the probability that the sixth toss will be tails? If 
the coin is fair, the right answer is one-half. Yet many people have a mental 
picture that when a fair coin is tossed a few times in a row, the resulting pattern 
will feature about the same number of heads and tails. Gambler’s fallacy arises 
because people misinterpret the law of averages; technically known as the “law 
of big numbers.” they think that the law of large numbers applies to small 
samples as well as to large samples. (Shefrin 2002: 17-18)
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Rational investors trade only with stocks or buy information if it increases their 
expected income. An investor who is overconfident will decrease his earnings 
by trading too much. This is because he has an unrealistically positive picture of 
his own talent to choose the right stocks. These overconfident investors have 
even on average more risk in their portfolios than others. (Odean 1999)
How can overconfidence be reduced? People who are overconfident could learn 
to be better calibrated after making 200 judgments and receiving intensive 
performance feedback. Overconfidence also could be eliminated by giving 
subjects feedback after five deceptively difficult problems. There have been 
some studies which show that overconfidence can be unlearned, although their 
applied value is somewhat limited. Few people will ever undergo special 
training sessions to become well calibrated. The most effective way to improve 
calibration seems to be very simple: Stop to consider reasons why your 
judgment might be wrong. (Plous 1993: 227–228)
4.1.3. Mind games in investment decision making
Conservatism states that individuals are slow to change their beliefs in the face 
of new evidence. Individuals’ subject to conservatism might disregard the full 
information content of earnings (or some other public) announcement, perhaps 
because they believe that this number contains a large temporary component, 
and still cling at least partially to their prior estimates of earnings. As a 
consequence they might adjust their valuation of shares only partially in 
response to the announcement. In particular, individuals tend to underweight 
useful statistical evidence relative to the less useful evidence used to form their 
priors. On the other hand they might be called being overconfident of their 
earlier information. (Barberis et. al. 1998).
Anchoring and adjustment is a psychological heuristic said to influence the way 
people estimate probabilities intuitively. It is difficult to protect against the 
effects of anchoring, partly because incentives for accuracy seldom work, and 
partly because the anchor values themselves often goes unnoticed. The first step 
toward protection is to be aware of any suggested values that seem unusually 
high or low. These are the anchor values most likely to produce biases in 
judgment. (Tversky et. al. 1974; Plous 1993: 151-152)
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Another interesting behavioral phenomena is aversion to ambiguity. The main 
point about aversion to ambiguity is that people prefer familiar more than 
unfamiliar. People tend to show an availability bias, overweighting evidence 
that comes easily to mind, thereby allowing their decisions to be over-
influenced by evidence that is more salient and attention-grabbing. (Shefrin 
2002: 20)
Cognitive and emotional limitations exist everywhere in the financial sector. 
The recognition of your own as well as the others’ mistakes is a beginning but it 
is not enough to earn free income. The goal of behavioral finance, the 
understanding of cognitive limitations and the decision-making process is to 
recognize the situations where it is possible to make a mistake. An investor has
to be wary of his own as well as the other practitioners’ mistakes.  (Shefrin 2002: 
21)
4.2. Frame Dependence
Frame dependence means that form is irrelevant to behavior. Proponents of 
traditional finance assume that framing is transparent. This means that 
practitioners can see through all the different ways cash flows might be 
described. Yet many frames are not transparent but rather are opaque. When a 
person has difficulty seeing through an unclear frame, his decisions typically 
depend on the particular frame he uses. Consequently, a difference in form is 
also a difference in substance. Behavior reflects frame dependence.
Prospect theory offered the first significant alternative to the expected utility 
paradigm that dominated research in finance until then. Prospect theory was 
based on experimental evidence about human behavior under uncertainty, and 
was built up to fit the evidence rather than embody an abstract sense of 
rationality. Prospect theory relies on evidence that when making economic 
decisions people are easily influenced by framing, that is by the context and 
ambience that accompany the decision problem. Part of this context is 
generated by the people themselves, as when they adopt arbitrary mental 
accounting of their financial circumstances. (Shefrin 2002; Shiller 2000).
4.2.1. Framing the investment decisions
31
The main point in loss aversion is that investors hate to lose and they are 
willing to do almost anything to avoid losing. In loss aversion, the function is 
steeper in the negative than in the positive domain; losses loom larger than 
corresponding gains. Diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains 
and losses decreases with their size. These properties give rise to an asymmetric 
S-shaped value function, concave above the reference point and convex below 
it, as illustrated in figure 3. (Tversky et. al. 1991)
Figure 2. An illustration of a value function
From loss aversion investors usually get to get-evenitis. Here is a good example 
of get-evenitis: In 1995, Nicholas Leeson became famous for having caused the 
collapse of his employer, 232-year-old Barings PLC. He lost over 1,4 billion 
through trading. In 1992, Leeson began to engage in rogue trading in order to 
hide errors made by subordinates. Eventually he incurred losses of his own and 
get-evenitis set in. He asserted that he gambled on the stock market to reverse 
his mistakes and save the bank. (Shefrin 2002: 24)
Mental accounting is a specific form of framing in which people segregate 
certain decisions. For example, an investor may take a lot of risk with one 
investment account but establish a very conservative position with another 
Gains
    Value
Losses
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account that is dedicated to her child’s education. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 398)
Statman (1997) argues that mental accounting is consistent with some investors’ 
irrational preference for stocks with high cash dividends. Odean (1998)
concludes that investors are more likely to sell stocks with gains rather than 
those with losses precisely contrary to a tax-minimization strategy.
The basic thing about hedonic editing is that investors prefer some frames to 
others. Investors are used to certain manners and one is that they do not like to 
lose. Realizing a loss would be a tough task for most people. For example it 
would be easier for people to accept a loss when a stockbroker says “transfer 
your assets”. This way you can induce the client to use a frame in which he 
reallocates assets from one mental account to another, rather than closing a 
mental account at a loss. Basically this means that you disguise the loss in 
different words and it affects to the investor decision making. (Shefrin 2002: 26–
27)
Prospect theory focuses on the way in which investors assess risk. This 
explanation, due to Barberis et. al. (1998), combines the Prospect Theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) with the idea that investors’ willingness to 
gamble rises with their stock market winnings (Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
Because they are so much ahead of what they paid for their investments, their 
willingness to bear risk is extremely high.
Fear and regret are important factors, which influence the way investors make 
their decisions. Psychologists have found that individuals who make decisions 
that turn out badly have more regret (blame themselves more) when that 
decision was more unconventional. For example, buying a blue-chip portfolio 
that turns down is not as painful as experiencing the same losses on an 
unknown start-up firm. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 399)
The tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning 
investments too soon is called the disposition effect. These investors 
demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than losers. Their 
behavior does not appear to be motivated by a desire to rebalance portfolios, or 
to avoid the higher trading costs of low priced stocks, nor is it justified by 
subsequent portfolio performance. For taxable investments, it is suboptimal and 
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leads to lower after-tax returns. Tax-motivated selling is most evident in 
December. (Odean 1998; Shefrin & Statman 1985, 1987)
4.2.2. Money illusion
Frame dependence also impacts the way, people deal with inflation, both 
cognitively and emotionally. This is the issue of money illusion. People frame 
their beliefs of money so that they only think about the nominal value of money 
and ignore the real value. This way they structure their perspectives incorrectly
and lose money by judging fundamentals wrong. Below is an example of 
money illusion: (Shafir, Diamond & Tversky 1997)
If person A earns €40 000 per year and person B earns €40 000 per 
year as well. During the first year, when person A started working,
there was not any inflation. When person B started working the 
inflation was 4 percent throughout the first year. After the first year A 
had €600 rise in salary and B had €1 500 rise in salary.
a. Which one was doing better in the beginning of second year, A or 
B?
b. Which one was happier in the beginning of the second year, A or 
B?
c. Which one was more likely to leave his present job for another job, 
A or B?
When it comes down to money illusion, inflation has the biggest effects. Most 
people think about this situation in nominal values. It makes the majority of 
people to say that person B has a better salary, he is happier and person A is 
likely to look for another job, but in real values person A is making more 
money. People are not used to think about inflation and they ignore its effect for 
money. (Shefrin 2002: 32)
4.3. Inefficient markets and anomalies
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The last 20 years have been very exciting for academic finance — perhaps 
almost as exciting as they were for financial markets. Among the many changes 
of views, the increased skepticism about market efficiency stands out. This 
skepticism derives from many sources, including the limitations of arbitrage, 
the accumulation of evidence on predictability of security returns, the 
observation of identical securities trading at different prices in different markets 
and the big movements in the stock markets, such as the 1987 and 2000 stock 
market bubbles. (Shleifer 2002: 175)
Fundamental analysis uses a much wider range of information to create 
portfolios than technical analysis. Investigations of the effectiveness of 
fundamental analysis ask, whether publicly available information beyond the 
trading history of a security can be used to improve investment performance, 
and therefore are tests of semistrong-form market efficiency. Surprisingly, 
several easily accessible statistics, for example a stock’s price-earnings ratio or 
its market capitalization, seem to predict abnormal risk-adjusted returns. 
Findings such as these are often referred to as efficient market anomalies.
(Bodie et. al. 2005: 388-389)
4.3.1. Small firm-in-January-Effect
The so called size or small-firm effect was originally documented by Banz 
(1981). The average returns on low-capitalization stocks are unusually high 
relative to those on large-capitalization stocks in early January, a phenomenon 
known as the turn-of-the-year effect. There has been evidence that the ratio of 
stock purchases to sales by individual investors displays a seasonal pattern, 
with individuals having a below-normal buy/sell ratio in late December and an 
above-normal ratio in early January.
The January effect is a widely discovered phenomenon. It is very common
especially in small firm stocks. The January effect has become a paradox for 
models of equilibrium expected stock returns and the efficient market 
hypothesis. Besides this, there has been significant evidence that January 
returns were higher for small firms whose prices had declined the previous 
year. The possible explanation for January effect is the tax-loss selling. (Thaler 
1987; Ritter 1988)
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4.3.2. Neglected-Firm effect & Liquidity effect
Neglected-Firm effect and liquidity effect are other interpretations of the small-
firm-in-January effect. Small firms tend to be neglected by large institutional 
traders; information about smaller firms is less available. This information 
deficiency makes smaller firms riskier investments that command higher 
returns. (Bodie et. al. 2005: 391)
4.3.3. Book-to-Market Ratios
Fama and French (1992) and Reinganum (1988) showed that a powerful 
predictor of returns across securities is the ratio of the book value of the firms’ 
equity to the market value of equity. The dramatic dependence of returns on 
book-to-market ratio is independent of beta, suggesting either that high book-
to-market ratio firms are relatively underpriced, or that the book-to-market 
ratio is serving as a proxy for a risk factor that affects equilibrium expected 
returns. In fact, Fama and French discovered that after controlling for the size 
and book-to-market effects, beta seemed to have no power to explain average 
security returns. This finding is a significant challenge to the notion of rational 
markets, since it seems to imply that a factor that should affect returns –
systematic risk – seems not to matter, while a factor that should not matter – the 
book-to-market ratio – seems capable of predicting future returns.  (Bodie et. al. 
2005: 391-392)
4.3.4. Post-Earnings-Announcement Price Drift
Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to note that even after earnings are 
announced, estimated cumulative “abnormal” returns continue to drift up for 
“good news” firms and down for “bad news” firms. Foster, Olsen and Shevlin 
(1984) found that over the 60 trading days subsequent to an earnings 
announcement an investor can make abnormal returns of 25 % in stocks with 
unexpected earnings. Post-Earnings-Announcement price drift happens when
significant news comes to the markets and investors overreact to this new 
information. Prices usually diverge from their real value for few minutes.  
Investors react to the earnings announcement and become aware of the full 
significance only as further information arrives.
36
There are two kinds of explanations for Post-Earnings-Announcement drifts.
One class of explanations suggests that at least a portion of the price response to 
new information is delayed. A second class of explanations suggests that, 
because the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) used to calculate abnormal 
returns is either incomplete or misestimated, researchers fail to adjust raw 
returns fully for risk. As a result, the so-called abnormal returns are nothing 
more than fair compensation for bearing risk that is priced but not captured by 
the CAPM estimated by the researchers. (Bernard & Thomas 1989).
4.3.5. P/E-anomaly
Price/Earnings anomaly is a widely recognized phenomenon. P/E figure can be 
counted when you divide the share price by the earnings per share. P/E ratio is 
easy to calculate because you can find these two figures with no trouble. 
Portfolios of low price-earnings (P/E) ratio stocks have higher returns than high 
P/E portfolios. The P/E effect holds up even if returns are adjusted for portfolio 
beta. Is this a confirmation that the market systematically misprices stocks 
according to P/E ratio? This would be an extremely surprising and, to us, 
disturbing conclusion, because analysis of P/E ratios is such a simple procedure. 
Although it may be possible to earn superior returns by using hard work and 
much insight, it hardly seems possible that such a simplistic technique is 
enough to generate abnormal returns. (Bodie et. al. 2005)
4.3.6. Price bubbles
There are several examples of price bubbles. A price bubble occurs when the 
price of a stock keeps rising without any important news just because noise 
traders are chasing the trend. A most immediate example of such an apparent 
bubble is internet stocks in 1998. For example the stocks of Yahoo!, EBay and 
Amazon.com kept on rising although they had negative earnings and a little 
market power. Noise traders pushed the price up. A better description of noise 
trader behavior in such bubbles is positive feedback trading.  Positive feedback 
investors buy securities after prices rise and sell after prices fall. This leaded to a 
stock market crash in the beginning of the year 2000. (Shleifer 2000: 154)
5. NOISE TRADER RISK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
37
There has been different kind of opinions how noise traders affect stock prices. 
The first researcher, who argued about the irrational traders, was Milton 
Friedman (1953). Friedman concluded that irrational traders will consistently 
lose money, will not survive and therefore cannot influence long-run asset 
prices. Since his work, survival and price impact have been assumed to be the 
same. Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2006) stated that survival and price 
impact are two independent concepts. The price impact of irrational traders 
does not rely on their long-run survival, and they can have a significant weight
on asset prices even when their wealth becomes negligible. They also show that 
irrational traders’ portfolio policies can deviate from their limits long after the 
price process approaches its long-run limit. The efficiency of financial markets 
is the principal motivation behind the interest in the survival of irrational 
traders. If irrational traders affect asset prices, then markets will not be efficient
in any way.
De Long et. al. (1990) point out that the risk created by the unpredictability of 
unsophisticated investors’ opinions significantly reduces the attractiveness of 
arbitrage. As long as arbitrageurs have short horizons and so must worry about 
liquidating their investment in a mispriced asset, their aggressiveness will be 
limited even in the absence of fundamental risk. They stated that in this case 
noise trading can lead to a large divergence between market prices and 
fundamental values. Moreover, noise traders may be compensated for bearing 
the risk that they themselves create and so earn higher returns than 
sophisticated investors even though they distort prices. Shleifer (2000: 28, 29) 
agree to this view by stating that if noise traders today are pessimistic about an 
asset and have driven out its price, an arbitrageur buying this asset must 
recognize that in the near future noise traders might become even more 
pessimistic and drive the price down even further. If the arbitrageur has to 
liquidate before the price recovers, he suffers a loss. Fear of this loss should 
limit his original arbitrage position. The same situation applies also conversely 
when there is a bullish market.
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5.1. Traditional finance vs. Behavioral finance
Traditional finance theory ignores the aspects of behavioral finance. The 
supporters of traditional finance say that behavioral finance is no more than 
good stories which have been invented to cause confusion between 
practitioners. They rely on the studies of Fama and Scholes and are not willing 
to accept the possibility that there is some truth about investors’ behavior and 
its effect on stock prices. 
At end of the 1970’s, the EMH was one of the great triumphs of twentieth-
century economics. The economic theory, particularly the theory of arbitrage, 
predicted that financial markets were efficient. Mountains of empirical evidence 
based on some of the most extensive data available in economics, that on 
security prices, almost universally confirmed the predictions of the theory. 
Whenever researchers found small money-making opportunities, they could be 
easily explained away by an argument of failure to adjust properly for risk. 
Jensen’s claim about the best established fact in economics was not all 
outrageous. (Shleifer 2000: 9–10). At that time, the rational expectations 
revolution in economic theory was in its first blush of enthusiasm, a fresh new 
idea that occupied the center of attention. The fact that speculative asset prices 
such as stock prices always incorporate the best information about fundamental 
values and that prices change only because of good, sensible information 
meshed very well with theoretical trends of the time. (Shiller 2002)
Fama (1998) concluded that market efficiency survives the challenge from the 
literature on long-term return anomalies. Consistent with the market efficiency 
hypothesis that the anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction to 
information is about as common as underreaction, and post-event continuation 
of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. Most 
important, consistent with the market efficiency prediction that apparent 
anomalies can be due to methodology, most long-term return anomalies tend to 
disappear with reasonable changes in technique.
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5.2. Behavioral finance vs. Traditional finance
Despite Fama’s (1998) study to prove the markets efficient, there have been a lot 
of evidence of anomalies, and that stock prices deviate from fundamental 
values. Shiller (1981) and Leroy et. al. (1981) found evidence for too much 
volatility in the markets. They stated that stock prices seem to deviate more 
than just to be explained by the information for future dividends. The 
divergence from the efficient market hypothesis was so big, that it can not be 
explained by other factors, such as errors in data or problems in the price-index. 
De Bondt et. al. (1985, 1987) concluded that research in experimental 
psychology has suggested that, in violation of Bayes’ rule, most people 
overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events. The question then arises 
whether such behavior matters at the market level. They found significant 
evidence that the stock market overreacts especially on January and that buying 
losers rather than winners has a major impact on stock prices. In revising their 
beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent information and underweight 
prior data. 
Financial markets often exhibit sharply rising prices and subsequent declines 
that cannot be justified by fundamental or realistic economic assessments. But 
the recent dramatic rise and fall of Internet-related technology shares have 
demonstrated that such spectacles are not relegated to distant eras. The 
immediate availability of information about every publicly traded company, 
along with omnipresent media analysis, seems to have done nothing to 
diminish the magnitude of bubbles. (Caginalp, Porter & Smith 2001)
When investors’ expectations for future earnings change so that they believe 
they can sell the stock in the future for more than they expected earlier, the 
market price of the stock will rise. If the rise of the stock derives from investor 
feelings, and there is no move in fundamentals, an asset bubble is born. The 
stock market crashes of 1987 and 2000 are due to irrational trading. Latest 
financial bubble in the year 2000 is a good example of a behavioral 
phenomenon.  Despite the fact that the availability and diffusion of information 
had improved a lot, this most recent bubble attained price levels that were over 
100 times their realistic valuation, even under the most optimistic estimates. 
There were not many professional investors that survived the technological 
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bubble. This is a good indication of the function of the markets and the 
difficulty of investing. (Campbell & Kyle 1992)
5.3. Objections to rational and irrational ways of investing
According to Hirschleifer (2001) neither the rational nor the irrational models of 
finance should be totally rejected. Instead, he concludes that the methods 
should be affiliated in a sensible way. He presented the following arguments
against both views:
Objection to Psychological Approach Objection to Fully Rational Approach
Alleged Psychological biases are 
arbitrary
Experiments that generate alleged 
psychological biases are not 
meaningful.
It is too easy to go theory fishing for 
psychological biases to match data 
ex post.
Rational traders should arbitrage 
away mispricing.
Rational investors will make better 
decisions and get richer.
Confused investors will learn their 
way to good decisions.
Apparent return predictability is 
spurious, so psychological models 
of predictability are misguided.
Rationality in finance theory requires 
impossible powers of calculation.
The evidence we possess does not 
support rational behavior.
It is too easy to go theory fishing for 
factor structures and market 
imperfections to match data ex post.
Irrational traders should arbitrage 
away efficient pricing.
Irrational investors will bear more risk 
and get richer.
Accurate investors will learn their way 
to bad decisions.
Apparent return predictability is 
spurious, so rational models of 
predictability are misguided.
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
6.1. The markets in Finland
Organized security trading began in Finland already in the 1860’s and the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange started its activity in the year 1912. The traditions of 
security trading are remarkably longer in many places. In London, security 
trading was in operation already in the end of 1500’s. The most famous stock 
exchange in the world, New York Stock Exchange, started its securities trading
in 1792. The Finnish stock market is one of the youngest and most illiquid 
markets in the world. (Pörssisäätiö)
The Helsinki stock exchange (HEX) was working as an independent exchange 
until the year 2005. On September 29, 2005, OMX presented its proposal for the 
OMX List, a common way of listing and presenting the portfolio of listed 
companies in the Nordic region. The OMX List replaced the current main list, I-
List and NM- List in the Helsinki stock exchange. The local stock exchanges in 
the Nordic region will continue to be the listing venue and point of contact for 
already listed companies and future applicants to the OMX List. (OMX)
6.2. Data
Data will consist of stocks in the Helsinki stock exchange. The intention of this 
study is to follow the stock prices in the 21st century when the financial markets 
have grown to a new scale. The year 2000 was excluded from the examination 
because of the stock market crash of January 2000. The whole year was overly
unstable and the market prices fluctuated unreliably. The period of data will be 
from 31.12.2000 to 31.12.2006.
OMX Helsinki and Bloomberg database are used to collect all required data. 
The final sample includes 60 stocks which will be separated into two different 
portfolios (each have 30 stocks). Table 2 shows the 30 stocks which were 
selected to the losing portfolio and table 3 provides the 30 stocks in the winning 
portfolio. Both portfolios include the biggest winners and losers in the selection 
period (31.12.2000-31.12.2002).
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End of the month data will be used in each of the stocks. If it was not possible to 
get a price for a security in the end of the month, the price of the previous 
month will be used. This should not cause any difficulties to our research. Some 
stocks in the samples had a split during this examination period. Those stocks’ 
prices have been adjusted according to the cumulative split adjustment factor
which is from the Bloomberg database, as well. This should not cause any 
problems when making approximates about returns during different periods
because the earnings of the securities are adjusted in the right ratio.
There are two anomalies that have to be taken into notice; the January effect 
and the small-firm-effect.  This study does not separate the large firms and the 
small firms so it is possible that the results might include errors of small-firm-
effects. The January effect is especially interesting because in the previous 
studies (De Bondt et al. 1985, 1987) were found that extreme past losers can 
have higher returns than winners in the beginning of the year and 3-12 months 
after. The stocks are also from different sectors which mean that there are for 
example technology companies and industry companies mixed in this sample.
Table 1 and table 2 include the stocks which are used in this research. Table 1 
and table 2 also contain the asset prices in the end of each time series which is 
examined. These stocks are chosen by randomly and they are the biggest 
“losers” and the biggest “winners” from January 2001 to December 2002. Any 
companies’ stocks which had gone to bankruptcy during the examination 
period were excluded from the data. All the stocks which have had a change in 
the series are excluded as well. This makes it easier to compare different time 
spans while every security in the data has a valuation on stock price during the 
whole examination period.
6.3. Model
This study will be closely related to De Bondt & Thaler (1985, 1987) and their 
study of does the stock market overreact. The model will calculate the extreme 
past losers and winners (from t-24 to t). Two portfolios will be formed and 3 
time spans will be followed; t+24, t+36 and t+48. The intention is to find out 
whether extreme past losers will beat the stocks which were winners in the past. 
The main implication to this study is the overreaction bias which is well known 
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among the supporters of behavioral finance. People overreact to new 
information no matter how relevant the new information is in reality. This can 
also be regarded as momentum effect when people are making approximates 
according to new information even though it might not be that relevant.
This study will first calculate the loser and the winner portfolios from January 
2001 until December 2002 (24 months). Then 3 different time lines will be 
formed; from January 2003 until December 2004 (24 months), From January 
2002 until December 2005 (36 months) and From January 2002 until December 
2006 (48 months). Table 3 concludes the whole path of this study.
Table 1. The path of the study
Model:
(1) PPortfolio = 30...21 aaa PPP 
Where,
Pportfolio = Price of the Portfolio at time t
12/2000 = t-24 12/2002 = t 12/2004 = t+24 12/2005 = t+36 12/2006 = t+48
The stock 






































Pa = Price of the asset at time t
In the second part of the research part, earnings between different quartiles will 
be followed. This study will also follow the January effect, if there is any, in the 
Helsinki stock exchange. For this model we have a cumulative monthly
earnings data from the Bloomberg database. Cumulative earnings will be 
calculated separately also between the losing and the winning portfolios. These 
results will be compared and analyzed carefully.
(2) 
Where,
Pquarterly = Price of the portfolio at the end of each quarter
And
Pa11 = Price of the asset in the end of each month during quarter
3*30







In this section, results of the tests are reported. It is being examined whether 
stocks that are extreme past losers will outperform the stocks that are extreme 
past winners. In many previous studies this has been called the momentum 
effect when stock prices are behaving strangely because of new information or 
non-information at all. The statistical significance of this research will be tested 
in the end.
7.1. The performance of losing and winning portfolios
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) concluded that momentum profits have continued 
in the 1990s, suggesting that the findings from the 1980s were not a product of 
data snooping bias. This empirical part tries to find if there is momentum in the 
2000 century in the Helsinki stock exchange and results will prove if the is any 
profit to be make from mispricing.
Figure 3 shows how the value of the losing portfolio was decreasing during our 
examination period from January 2001 to December 2002 (from t-24 to t). The 
total downswing was 74,37 %. However, the following 24 months after the 
portfolio formation, the losing stocks got off to a flying start and the total profit 
was 80,35 % while the portfolio price climbed from 81,79 euros to 146,89 euros
to the end of December 2004 (figure 3 and appendix 3). At the same time the 
stocks in the winning portfolio (figure 4 and appendix 4) were doing well 
despite of the market crash in January 2000. The total upswing from January 
2001 to December 2002 was 40,06 %. A new portfolio of the winning stocks was 
then formed and value of the portfolio increases by 61,55 % during the next 
examination period (from January 2003 to December 2004).  This result confirms 
the previous studies’ findings that extreme past losing stocks seem to 
outperform the past winning stocks in a short period of time.
When looking at the next time sequence, it is clear what happens to the market 
prices. The stocks of the winning portfolio keep on increasing (t+36 = 106,92 %) 
while the “loser” portfolio’s performance calms down (t+36 = 85,82 %). In a 
whole, the loser portfolio increases only 3,02 % while the winning portfolio has 
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a performance of 28,09 % during the year 2005. The third year after the portfolio 
formation shows that the winning portfolios are making far better profit than 
the losing ones.
The last examination period is from January 2003 to December 2006 (from t to 
t+48). During this time the losing portfolio has increased by 60,42 % and the 
winning portfolio by 151,18 %. The loser portfolio has actually decreased in the 
year 2006 by -13,29 % and in the mean time the winner portfolio has increased 
by 21,39 %. 
In a summary, the extreme past losing portfolios do not outperform the past 
winning portfolios in a long period of time. That can happen in shorter terms
like 4-12 months after the portfolio formation. Many previous studies suggest 
that this can be viewed as markets correcting the prices closer to fundamental 
values. One reason for this is because by time overconfident investors (noise 
traders) and their actions have caused the divergence in market and 
fundamental values. These results confirm the previous findings which stated 
that in the end winning portfolios will outperform the losing ones.
Stocks have always been thought as an investment for a long period of time. It 
is really hard to make profit by acting according to momentum and single news 
about the firm.  Taking a position in a stock and keeping that, say 5-10 years, 
has been proved in many studies to be the most efficient way to earn income. 
Noise traders especially seem to act when there is momentum and some kind of 
news release.
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Figure 3.  The performance of the losing portfolio
Figure 4. The performance of the winning portfolio
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Name Short name t-24 t t+24 t+36 t+48
Aspocomp Group Oyj ACG1V 30,00 6,25 9,72 7,50 3,56
Aldata Solution Oyj ALD1V 6,57 0,88 1,11 1,85 1,77
Proha Oyj ART1V 2,95 0,52 0,45 0,36 0,40
Biohit Oyj B BIOBV 6,20 1,41 2,06 2,15 2,03
Benefon S BNFSV 8,15 0,72 0,12 0,25 0,22
Cencorp Oyj CNC1V 4,62 0,36 0,66 1,23 0,44
Comptel Oyj CTL1V 15,35 1,00 1,86 1,64 1,80
Elektrobit Group Oyj EBG1V 2,58 0,29 0,56 0,19 0,21
Efore Oyj A EFO1V 6,80 1,54 24,96 14,32 9,60
Elisa Communications Oyj A ELI1V 22,93 5,72 11,86 15,65 20,75
Elcoteq Network Oyj A ELQAV 33,50 10,80 17,89 20,15 9,78
Evox Rifa Group Oyj ERG1V 0,22 0,06 0,10 0,07 0,08
Evia Oyj EVI1V 2,69 1,08 1,10 1,33 1,11
F-Secure Oyj FSC1V 5,20 0,75 1,81 2,04 2,25
Incap Oyj ICP1V 4,50 2,01 1,90 1,87 2,51
Nokia Oyj NOK1V 47,50 15,15 11,62 15,45 15,48
Okmetic Oyj OKM1V 5,16 2,30 2,44 1,78 3,69
Oral Hammaslääkärit Plc ORA1V 0,81 0,02 1,92 1,37 3,02
Perlos Oyj POS1V 22,00 6,01 11,77 8,95 3,51
Ruukki Group Oyj RUG1V 0,07 0,03 0,04 0,06 0,12
Satama Interactive Oyj SAI1V 1,26 0,50 0,88 1,04 1,00
Scanfil SCF1V 10,50 3,30 4,58 4,38 2,37
Stonesoft Oyj SFT1V 15,37 0,55 0,58 0,51 0,47
SSH Communications Security Oy SSH1V 15,40 0,75 1,28 1,23 1,15
TietoEnator Oyj TIE1V 30,30 13,00 23,40 30,85 24,44
Tieto-X Oyj TIX1V 4,29 1,96 3,95 3,76 4,63
TJ Group Oyj TJT1V 1,14 0,14 0,16 0,06 0,05
Tekla Oyj A TLA1V 5,18 1,58 1,87 3,42 7,88
Talentum Oyj TTM1V 6,55 2,86 5,90 7,40 6,58
Turvatiimi TUT1V 1,35 0,25 0,34 0,46 0,31
Table 2. Stocks of the losing portfolio
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Price
Name Short name t-24 t t+24 t+36 t+48
Amer-Yhtymä Oyj A AMEAS 28,00 34,90 38,55 47,19 50,04
Aspo Oyj ASU1V 5,00 8,94 15,30 10,35 10,20
Atria Oyj A ATRAV 4,29 7,70 11,30 17,99 18,29
Citycon Oyj CTY1S 0,94 1,10 2,44 3,11 5,05
EQ Online Oyj EQO1V 1,21 1,50 2,06 2,50 4,84
Fortum Oyj FUM1V 4,35 6,25 13,62 15,84 21,56
HK Ruokatalo A HKRAV 1,60 5,95 7,36 9,86 14,50
Huhtamäki Oyj HUH1V 28,40 38,20 47,48 55,64 59,52
Ilkka-Yhtymä 2 ILK2S 18,40 22,50 29,92 43,80 51,35
Interavanti Oyj INA1S 1,53 2,21 3,51 5,50 5,31
J. Tallberg-Kiinteistöt Oy B JTKBS 4,20 5,40 9,78 13,04 18,70
Kasola Oyj A KASAS 1,30 1,50 1,75 2,55 3,40
Kesla A KELAS 4,25 5,00 9,18 20,94 8,46
Kemira Oyj KRA1V 5,40 6,55 10,16 13,48 17,03
Keskisuomalainen Oyj A KSLAV 28,00 38,00 71,16 85,72 72,80
Larox B LARBS 5,12 7,50 13,98 18,30 27,00
Lemminkäinen Oy LEM1S 12,35 16,00 15,74 30,50 36,10
Marimekko MMO1V 5,00 14,30 39,19 43,30 39,06
Neomarkka Oyj B NEMBV 3,80 5,50 7,35 7,75 7,76
Nokian Renkaat Oyj NRE1V 17,90 33,99 111,80 106,50 155,20
Norvestia Oy B NVABV 11,70 14,20 13,06 17,10 18,58
Olvi Oyj A OLVAS 17,20 21,00 26,34 42,20 80,00
Panostaja Oyj B PNABS 2,70 4,26 7,80 11,76 19,08
Sponda Oyj SDA1V 3,95 5,45 7,18 7,95 12,00
Oy Stockmann Ab A STCAS 11,39 13,84 21,10 32,38 36,40
Oy Stockmann Ab B STCBV 10,40 13,80 21,70 32,53 36,48
Stromsdal Oyj B STM1V 1,20 2,90 1,96 1,46 0,71
Tamfelt Oyj Abp etu TAFPS 17,98 29,00 23,94 24,15 31,95
Tulikivi Oy A TULAV 17,45 20,00 31,60 40,80 70,20
YIT-Yhtymä Oy YTY1V 13,60 16,79 36,72 72,26 83,80
Table 3. Stocks of the winning portfolio
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7.2. January returns and monthly return data
One of the interesting results in previous papers (De Bondt et. al. 1987; 
Reinganum 1988) was that a large portion of the excess returns occurs in 
January. Using the cumulative logarithmic earnings data from Bloomberg, we 
will now explore this curious fact. These earlier findings link these January 
returns either to tax code or to seasonality in the risk-return relationship. Tax-
code happens in the end of the year when people realize losses to get them 
deducted in their taxation.
In this research, it is visible that the losing portfolio (table 4) is getting, in 
average, excess returns in January more so than in the coming months after that 
(1,18 %). The winning portfolio (table 5) is making abnormal returns in January, 
as well (10,44 %). This indicates that the January excess returns of both, winners 
and losers, show significant short-term reversals. For losers these reversals may 
reflect tax-loss selling pressure. For winners, the short-run reversals are 
consistent with a capital gains tax lock-in effect (De Bondt et. al. 1987).
Cumulative logarithmic montly return data Losing portfolio
Year January 1-3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-12 months Total/year
2001 -3,40 -16,12 -2,67 -14,53 7,23 -26,10
2002 -0,63 -2,13 -10,27 -10,16 0,06 -22,50
2003 -1,10 -3,47 8,88 6,81 6,98 19,20
2004 4,48 1,90 -1,92 -1,58 -0,80 -2,40
2005 -0,53 1,08 0,15 1,74 -2,38 0,59
2006 2,36 3,99 -3,19 -1,84 0,01 -1,03
Total/quarter 1,18 -14,76 -9,01 -19,56 11,10 
Mean 0,20 -2,46 -1,50 -3,26 1,85
Table 4. Logarithmic return data of the losing portfolio
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Cumulative logarithmic montly return data Winning portfolio
Year January 1-3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-12 months Total/year
2001 1,30 2,37 0,94 0,03 4,87 8,21
2002 1,69 4,52 0,58 -2,08 2,37 5,39
2003 0,47 -0,55 1,46 3,75 1,98 6,64
2004 1,86 3,29 0,65 0,51 -0,80 3,65
2005 2,15 3,80 1,69 3,12 0,03 8,64
2006 2,96 4,01 -3,19 0,82 4,08 5,72
Total/quarter 10,44 17,44 2,14 6,15 12,53 
Mean 1,74 2,91 0,36 1,02 2,09
Table 5. Logarithmic return data of the winning portfolio
It is interesting to notice that the losing portfolio is making highest returns in 
average from October to December (11,10 %). The winning portfolio’s abnormal 
return is 12,53 % during the same time. Grinblatt et. al. (2001) argue that 
investors are reluctant to realize their losses except in December, when the urge 
to realize large losses for tax purposes tends to eliminate this fact. Tax-loss 
selling is one of the biggest motivators in realizing a loss and selling the asset.
If you take a closer look at the year after the portfolio formation (2003), it is 
noticeable that the loser portfolio’s earnings quarterly are -3,47 %, 8,88 %, 6,81 
% and 6,98 %, respectively. This indicates quite clearly that the market is 
correcting its prices after the big decrease during the examination period and it 
is happening between 4-12 months. Are these corrections because of investor 
overconfidence is another question. Some previous studies consider that to be 
the case.
The winning portfolio’s performance during the test and the valuation period 
does not vary much. This is against the proposal that the past winners should 
perform worse than the past losers. When you compare the winning and the
losing portfolios four years after the portfolio formation, it is clear that the 
winning stocks have totally outperformed the losing ones.
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7.3. OMX Helsinki Benchmark and portfolio performance
This section will compare the development of losing and winning portfolios to 
OMX Helsinki Benchmark index (OMXHB) which includes 50-70 biggest and 
most traded stocks in OMX Helsinki. OMX Helsinki Benchmark has a wide 
variety of stocks included so it presents closely how the markets are performing 
during the test period. OMXHB shows how the markets are behaving in 
average while these portfolios in the research are the extreme stocks in the 
OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Table 6 shows that the extreme portfolios’ (when 
the worst and the best performing stocks are chosen) performance percentages 
are a lot more volatile than the index.
During the first examination period OMXHB has decreased 55,88 % while the 
losing portfolio has declined 74,37 % and the winning portfolio has increased 
40,06 %. As already stated, the portfolios in this study contain the extreme 
stocks and these results confirm the fact. If you follow each of the examination 
periods you discover that the portfolios are performing in percentage terms a 
lot differently than the OMXHB. Even after the period 2001-2002, the markets 
are declining and mean while the portfolios in this study are increasing heavily.
This proves the fact that putting your funds to winning stocks is a good 
investment while it looks like the losing portfolio is getting good results as well 
comparing to OMXHB. The losing portfolio is obviously a lot more risky and 
thus more volatile than the market index.  It would be interesting to see the 
results of these portfolios after 10 years after the portfolio performance. 
Previous studies suggest that the differences between the performances would 










31.12.2002 -55,88 % -74,37 % 40,06 %
31.12.2004 -5,23 % 79,59 % 61,55 %
31.12.2005 23,10 % 85,01 % 106,92 %
31.12.2006 43,68 % 60,42 % 150,44 %
Table 6. OMX Helsinki Benchmark index and portfolio performance
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7.4. Statistical significance of the research
If the t value that is calculated is above 0,05, then the null hypothesis that the 
two groups do not differ is rejected and on the other hand the opposite 
hypothesis which typically states that the groups do differ is accepted.
To test the statistical significance of the study, a t-test is used. The t-test assesses 
whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each other. The 
t column (see appendix 1 and appendix 2) displays the observed t statistic for 
each sample. It is calculated as the ratio of the difference between sample means 
divided by the standard error of the difference. Appendix 1 and 2 provide
descriptive statistic of the winning and losing portfolios.  The means of the 
losing portfolios in the end of each research year 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006 
are 10,64; 2,77; 4,90; 5,04 and 4,37 respectively and for the winning portfolios 
9,62; 13,47; 21,77; 27,88 and 33,85 respectively. The difference in the average 
stock prices between the two samples is not significant at the 0,05 level (t = 
0,703; 0; 0; 0 and 0 respectively). The t-value of 0,703 between the samples in the 
year 2000 asserts that the means do not differ that much. However, when you 
consider the t-statistic in the rest of the samples (t = 0), this quite clearly shows 
that the means are totally different between the winning and the losing 
portfolios. 
Levene's analysis tests the null hypothesis that the variances in the samples are 
equal. If the resulting values of Levene's test is less than 0,05 (confidence level 
in this research), the obtained differences in sample variances are unlikely to 
have occurred based on random sampling. Thus, the null hypothesis of equal 
variances is rejected and it is concluded that there is a difference between the 
variances in the sample. The statistic of this examination state that Levene’s 
value is 0,222 for the prices in the beginning of 2001 between loser and winner 
portfolios. This proves that the variances are not totally different but differ 
anyway since the value is close to 0,05 confidence level. The significance of the 
rest of the prices in the year end have a value of 0,00, which concludes in 
certainty that the variances between losing and winning portfolios are entirely 
different. 
When testing the means of the returns of January and different quartiles, we 
discover that these are not that significant in a 0,05 confidence level. We found 
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this kind of results: January t-statistic is 0,224, from January to March t-statistic 
is 0,108 and from July to September t-statistic is 0,225. The means of these 
sample periods differ pretty certainly from each other, even though they are not 
at the 0,05 confidence level. The second quartile from April to June has a t 
statistic of 0,496 and the fourth quartile from October to December has a t-
statistic of 0,904. These figures show evidence that the earnings of losing and 
winning portfolios do not seem to differ that much in the year end. The biggest
differences in the earnings seem to come in the beginning of the year and the 
third quartile.
Looking at the possibility of equality of variances in earnings between different 
quartiles, we discover that the variances differ for sure in January and the third 
quartile (sig. = 0,036 and 0,030). The significance level in the first (0,11), the 
second (0,157) and the fourth quartile is very close to the 0,05 confidence level 
as well. By conclusion, we can confirm that the variance levels between the 
losing and winning portfolios differ and thereby the losing and winning 
portfolios are not dependent on each other.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The main implications of this study were noise traders, the momentum affect
and the overreaction hypothesis. Among the supporters of behavioral finance it 
is generally believed that noise traders are the cause and effect to the 
overreaction of security prices. This study does not really prove the fact that 
this is to be the case but from the previous papers it is possible to find some 
indications that this can indeed be true. The performances of stocks have been 
widely examined during the last hundred years. Many revealing studies have 
been written and new stock valuation models have been invented. This study 
continued the same route which these previous studies have set.
When comparing the first two years after the portfolio formation it was 
discovered that the losing stocks do indeed top the winning stocks. Actually 
this phenomenon happens already during the first year after the portfolio 
formation. The main explanation for this phenomenon might be that the 
markets are correcting themselves. The divergence of prices has probably been 
set off by the overconfidence bias which irrational investors spread while they 
are making false approximates of the future returns of the stock. Finally, 
markets are correcting the price differences closer to their fundamental values.
Manu professional investors call this the momentum effect when investing to 
stocks which have been losers in the previous 2 years.
The key finding of this study was that the extreme past winners outperform the 
extreme past losers in a longer period of time (3-4 years after the portfolio 
formation) in the Helsinki stock exchange. The prices of the losing portfolio are 
very stable after the correction effects and there does not seem to be any leaps 
up or down. On the other hand the winning portfolio is increasing very firmly 
during the whole examination period. While this is a small liquidity market
place it would be interesting to see what kind of results one can obtain with 
these methods from bigger stock exchanges.
The cumulative logarithmic monthly return data from Bloomberg database 
proves more precisely what is happening to the stock prices between different 
quartiles and January. There seems to be excess income for both portfolios in 
January. Previous studies have found this to be January effect when markets are 
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generally rising. The results in this study agree to this view while on average 
losing portfolio is making slightly positive earnings on January and winning 
portfolio has a mean of 1,74 euros during the examination period. In fact, the 
fluctuations seem to very modest in January when comparing to other quartiles.
It is generally believed that investors sell their losing assets in the end of the 
year because they can cut those losses in taxation. This study provides evidence 
of this as the losing portfolio has a lot of abnormal returns in the final quarters 
of each year or at least is performing better than in other quartiles. Even though 
irrational traders are unwilling to realize losses, the tax effect seems to be a 
great motivator for selling the asset in a loss.
Noise trading is a very unifying phenomenon. It is the cause to many things in 
the financial markets as well as in every day life; 90 pro cents of people think
their driving skills are better than others, 80 pro cent of the poker players think 
that their skills are above average although all the time 50 per cent of the 
players at least have to be losing players (probably higher). These are very 
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Price00 Losing portfolio 30 10,64 11,80 2,15
Winning portfolio 30 9,62 8,55 1,56
Price02 Losing portfolio 30 2,73 3,92 0,72
Winning portfolio 30 13,47 11,46 2,09
Price04 Losing portfolio 30 4,90 6,91 1,26
Winning portfolio 30 21,77 23,30 4,25
Price05 Losing portfolio 30 5,04 7,31 1,33
Winning portfolio 30 27,88 25,79 4,71
Price06 Losing portfolio 30 4,37 6,12 1,12
Winning portfolio 30 33,85 33,28 6,08
Independent Samples Test Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df







Price00 Equal variances assumed 1,523 0,222 0,383 58 0,703 1,01767 2,65990 -4,30671 6,34204
Equal variances not assumed 0,383 52,870 0,704 1,01767 2,65990 -4,31773 6,35306
Price02 Equal variances assumed 24,198 0,000 -4,861 58 0,000 -10,74800 2,21102 -15,17384 -6,32216
Equal variances not assumed -4,861 35,684 0,000 -10,74800 2,21102 -15,23353 -6,26247
Price04 Equal variances assumed 11,529 0,001 -3,802 58 0,000 -16,87133 4,43720 -25,75335 -7,98931
Equal variances not assumed -3,802 34,065 0,001 -16,87133 4,43720 -25,88817 -7,85449
Price05 Equal variances assumed 22,690 0,000 -4,667 58 0,000 -22,83767 4,89356 -32,63319 -13,04214
Equal variances not assumed -4,667 33,630 0,000 -22,83767 4,89356 -32,78661 -12,88872
Price06 Equal variances assumed 23,438 0,000 -4,771 58 0,000 -29,47200 6,17790 -41,83841 -17,10559
Equal variances not assumed -4,771 30,962 0,000 -29,47200 6,17790 -42,07253 -16,87147
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January Losing portfolio 6 0,20 2,79 1,14
Winning portfolio 6 1,74 0,83 0,34
JanuaryToMarch Losing portfolio 6 -2,46 7,22 2,95
Winning portfolio 6 2,91 1,84 0,75
AprilToJune Losing portfolio 6 -1,50 6,19 2,53
Winning portfolio 6 0,36 1,79 0,73
JulyToSeptember Losing portfolio 6 -3,26 7,82 3,19
Winning portfolio 6 1,03 2,13 0,87
OctoberToDecember Losing portfolio 6 1,85 4,17 1,70
Winning portfolio 6 2,09 2,21 0,90
Independent Samples Test Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means






January Equal variances assumed 5,834 0,036 -1,298 10,000 0,224 -1,542 1,18793 -4,18855 1,10522
Equal variances not assumed -1,298 5,888 0,243 -1,542 1,18793 -4,46184 1,37850
JanuaryToMarch Equal variances assumed 3,074 0,110 -1,763 10,000 0,108 -5,365 3,04341 -12,14614 1,41614
Equal variances not assumed -1,763 5,649 0,131 -5,365 3,04341 -12,92557 2,19557
AprilToJune Equal variances assumed 2,337 0,157 -0,706 10,000 0,496 -1,858 2,63205 -7,72292 4,00625
Equal variances not assumed -0,706 5,831 0,507 -1,858 2,63205 -8,34424 4,62757
JulyToSeptember Equal variances assumed 6,386 0,030 -1,295 10,000 0,225 -4,285 3,30968 -11,65943 3,08943
Equal variances not assumed -1,295 5,740 0,245 -4,285 3,30968 -12,47333 3,90333
OctoberToDecember Equal variances assumed 4,847 0,052 -0,124 10,000 0,904 -0,238 1,92476 -4,52697 4,05030
Equal variances not assumed -0,124 7,604 0,905 -0,238 1,92476 -4,71742 4,24076
64



































t-24 t From t-24 to t t+24 From t to t+24 t+36 From t to t+36 t+48 From t to t+48
ACG1V 30,00 6,25 -23,75 -79,17 % 9,72 3,47 55,52 % 7,50 1,25 20,00 % 3,56 -2,69 -43,04 %
ALD1V 6,57 0,88 -5,69 -86,60 % 1,11 0,23 26,14 % 1,85 0,97 110,23 % 1,77 0,89 101,14 %
ART1V 2,95 0,52 -2,43 -82,37 % 0,45 -0,07 -13,46 % 0,36 -0,16 -30,77 % 0,40 -0,12 -23,08 %
BIOBV 6,20 1,41 -4,79 -77,26 % 2,06 0,65 46,10 % 2,15 0,74 52,48 % 2,03 0,62 43,97 %
BNFSV 8,15 0,72 -7,43 -91,17 % 0,12 -0,60 -83,33 % 0,25 -0,47 -65,28 % 0,22 -0,50 -69,44 %
CNC1V 4,62 0,36 -4,26 -92,21 % 0,66 0,30 83,33 % 1,23 0,87 241,67 % 0,44 0,08 22,22 %
CTL1V 15,35 1,00 -14,35 -93,49 % 1,86 0,86 86,00 % 1,64 0,64 64,00 % 1,80 0,80 80,00 %
EBG1V 2,58 0,29 -2,29 -88,76 % 0,56 0,27 93,10 % 0,19 -0,10 -35,52 % 0,21 -0,08 -28,97 %
EFO1V 6,80 1,54 -5,26 -77,35 % 24,96 23,42 3041,56 % 14,32 12,78 829,87 % 9,60 8,06 523,38 %
ELI1V 22,93 5,72 -17,21 -75,06 % 11,86 6,14 107,34 % 15,65 9,93 173,60 % 20,75 15,03 262,76 %
ELQAV 33,50 10,80 -22,70 -67,76 % 17,89 7,09 65,65 % 20,15 9,35 86,57 % 9,78 -1,02 -9,44 %
ERG1V 0,22 0,06 -0,16 -72,77 % 0,10 0,04 66,67 % 0,07 0,01 16,67 % 0,08 0,02 33,33 %
EVI1V 2,69 1,08 -1,61 -59,84 % 1,10 0,02 1,85 % 1,33 0,25 23,15 % 1,11 0,03 2,78 %
FSC1V 5,20 0,75 -4,45 -85,58 % 1,81 1,06 141,33 % 2,04 1,29 172,00 % 2,25 1,50 200,00 %
ICP1V 4,50 2,01 -2,49 -55,34 % 1,90 -0,11 -5,47 % 1,87 -0,14 -6,97 % 2,51 0,50 24,88 %
NOK1V 47,50 15,15 -32,35 -68,11 % 11,62 -3,53 -23,30 % 15,45 0,30 1,98 % 15,48 0,33 2,18 %
OKM1V 5,16 2,30 -2,86 -55,43 % 2,44 0,14 6,09 % 1,78 -0,52 -22,61 % 3,69 1,39 60,43 %
ORA1V 0,81 0,02 -0,79 -97,53 % 1,92 1,90 9500,00 % 1,37 1,35 6750,00 % 3,02 3,00 15000,00 %
POS1V 22,00 6,01 -15,99 -72,68 % 11,77 5,76 95,84 % 8,95 2,94 48,92 % 3,51 -2,50 -41,60 %
RUG1V 0,07 0,03 -0,04 -57,53 % 0,04 0,01 33,33 % 0,06 0,03 110,00 % 0,12 0,09 300,00 %
SAI1V 1,26 0,50 -0,76 -60,31 % 0,88 0,38 76,00 % 1,04 0,54 108,00 % 1,00 0,50 100,00 %
SCF1V 10,50 3,30 -7,20 -68,57 % 4,58 1,28 38,79 % 4,38 1,08 32,73 % 2,37 -0,93 -28,18 %
SFT1V 15,37 0,55 -14,82 -96,42 % 0,58 0,03 5,45 % 0,51 -0,04 -7,27 % 0,47 -0,08 -14,55 %
SSH1V 15,40 0,75 -14,65 -95,13 % 1,28 0,53 70,67 % 1,23 0,48 64,00 % 1,15 0,40 53,33 %
TIE1V 30,30 13,00 -17,30 -57,10 % 23,40 10,40 80,00 % 30,85 17,85 137,31 % 24,44 11,44 88,00 %
TIX1V 4,29 1,96 -2,33 -54,32 % 3,95 1,99 101,53 % 3,76 1,80 91,84 % 4,63 2,67 136,22 %
TJT1V 1,14 0,14 -1,00 -87,72 % 0,16 0,02 14,29 % 0,06 -0,08 -57,14 % 0,05 -0,09 -64,29 %
TLA1V 5,18 1,58 -3,60 -69,50 % 1,87 0,29 18,35 % 3,42 1,84 116,46 % 7,88 6,30 398,73 %
TTM1V 6,55 2,86 -3,69 -56,33 % 5,90 3,04 106,29 % 7,40 4,54 158,74 % 6,58 3,72 130,07 %
TUT1V 1,35 0,25 -1,10 -81,49 % 0,34 0,09 36,00 % 0,46 0,21 84,00 % 0,31 0,06 24,00 %





































t-24 t From t-24 to t t+24 From t to t+24 t+36 From t to t+36 t+48 From t to t+48
AMEAS 28,00 34,90 6,90 24,64 % 38,55 3,65 10,46 % 47,19 12,29 35,21 % 50,04 15,14 43,38 %
ASU1V 5,00 8,94 3,94 78,79 % 15,30 6,36 71,14 % 10,35 1,41 15,77 % 10,20 1,26 14,09 %
ATRAV 4,29 7,70 3,41 79,47 % 11,30 3,60 46,75 % 17,99 10,29 133,64 % 18,29 10,59 137,53 %
CTY1S 0,94 1,10 0,16 17,00 % 2,44 1,34 121,82 % 3,11 2,01 182,73 % 5,05 3,95 359,09 %
EQO1V 1,21 1,50 0,29 24,04 % 2,06 0,56 37,33 % 2,50 1,00 66,67 % 4,84 3,34 222,67 %
FUM1V 4,35 6,25 1,90 43,70 % 13,62 7,37 117,92 % 15,84 9,59 153,44 % 21,56 15,31 244,96 %
HKRAV 1,60 5,95 4,35 272,00 % 7,36 1,41 23,70 % 9,86 3,91 65,71 % 14,50 8,55 143,70 %
HUH1V 28,40 38,20 9,80 34,51 % 47,48 9,28 97,17 % 55,64 17,44 45,65 % 59,52 21,32 55,81 %
ILK2S 18,40 22,50 4,10 22,28 % 29,92 7,42 32,98 % 43,80 21,30 94,67 % 51,35 28,85 128,20 %
INA1S 1,53 2,21 0,68 44,40 % 3,51 1,30 58,82 % 5,50 3,29 148,87 % 5,31 3,10 140,27 %
JTKBS 4,20 5,40 1,20 28,58 % 9,78 4,38 81,11 % 13,04 7,64 141,48 % 18,70 13,30 246,30 %
KASAS 1,30 1,50 0,20 15,38 % 1,75 0,25 16,67 % 2,55 1,05 70,00 % 3,40 1,90 126,67 %
KELAS 4,25 5,00 0,75 17,64 % 9,18 4,18 83,60 % 20,94 15,94 318,80 % 8,46 3,46 69,20 %
KRA1V 5,40 6,55 1,15 21,30 % 10,16 3,61 55,11 % 13,48 6,93 105,80 % 17,03 10,48 160,00 %
KSLAV 28,00 38,00 10,00 35,71 % 71,16 33,16 87,26 % 85,72 47,72 125,58 % 72,80 34,80 91,58 %
LARBS 5,12 7,50 2,38 46,48 % 13,98 6,48 86,40 % 18,30 10,80 144,00 % 27,00 19,50 260,00 %
LEM1S 12,35 16,00 3,65 29,55 % 15,74 -0,26 -1,63 % 30,50 14,50 90,63 % 36,10 20,10 125,63 %
MMO1V 5,00 14,30 9,30 185,99 % 39,19 24,89 174,06 % 43,30 29,00 202,77 % 39,06 24,76 173,13 %
NEMBV 3,80 5,50 1,70 44,76 % 7,35 1,85 33,64 % 7,75 2,25 40,91 % 7,76 2,26 41,09 %
NRE1V 17,90 33,99 16,09 89,89 % 111,80 77,81 228,92 % 106,50 72,51 213,33 % 155,20 121,21 356,60 %
NVABV 11,70 14,20 2,50 21,36 % 13,06 -1,14 -8,03 % 17,10 2,90 20,42 % 18,58 4,38 30,85 %
OLVAS 17,20 21,00 3,80 22,09 % 26,34 5,34 25,43 % 42,20 21,20 100,95 % 80,00 59,00 280,95 %
PNABS 2,70 4,26 1,56 57,81 % 7,80 3,54 498,59 % 11,76 7,50 176,06 % 19,08 14,82 347,89 %
SDA1V 3,95 5,45 1,50 37,95 % 7,18 1,73 31,74 % 7,95 2,50 45,87 % 12,00 6,55 120,18 %
STCAS 11,39 13,84 2,45 21,51 % 21,10 7,26 52,46 % 32,38 18,54 133,96 % 36,40 22,56 163,01 %
STCBV 10,40 13,80 3,40 32,68 % 21,70 7,90 57,25 % 32,53 18,73 135,72 % 36,48 22,68 164,35 %
STM1V 1,20 2,90 1,70 141,83 % 1,96 -0,94 -32,41 % 1,46 -1,44 -49,66 % 0,71 -2,19 -75,52 %
TAFPS 17,98 29,00 11,02 61,30 % 23,94 -5,06 -17,45 % 24,15 -4,85 -16,72 % 31,95 2,95 10,17 %
TULAV 17,45 20,00 2,55 14,62 % 31,60 11,60 58,00 % 40,80 20,80 104,00 % 70,20 50,20 251,00 %
YTY1V 13,60 16,79 3,19 23,46 % 36,72 19,93 118,70 % 72,26 55,47 330,38 % 83,80 67,01 399,11 %
Winners 288,61 404,23 115,62 40,06 % 653,03 248,80 61,55 % 836,45 432,22 106,92 % 1015,36 611,13 151,18 %
